EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.60 A YEAR. SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS
EDITORIAL BOARD
WILLIAm W. GAGER, CHAS. E. CLARK,
Chairman Grad. Treasurer
CLARENCE E. BARTON, CLAREMONT I. TOLLES,
Comment and Recent Business Manager
Case Editor
B. SELDEN BACON, JOHN J. McDoNALD,
CHANDLER BENmTT, ALEXANDER MILLER,
CLAYTON Y. BROWN, LOUIS SACHS,
ARTHUR N. HERMAN, SAmuEL H. SnRAus,
MAX H. LEVINE, CARROLL R. WARD.
Published monthly during the Academic year, by THE YALE LAW JOURNAL COMPANY, INC.
P. 0. Address, Drawer Q, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his
subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a con-
tinuation of the subscription is desired.
FORMER TESTIMONY AS EVIDENCE.
The testimony of a witness in an action brought by the
plaintiff, as next friend of his daughter, to recover for her
injuries received in a collision between his buggy and the
defendant's street car, was held admissible in a subsequent
action by the plaintiff to recover for his own injuries received
in the same collision; the witness having since died. This
Rhode Island case" held, in effect, that the oath and opportunity
for cross-examination, besides the all-important requisite of
relevancy, were the deciding factors which determined the
admissibility of this class of evidence.
The general rule as laid down by the courts and the leading
text-writers2 is to the effect that such testimony will be admitted
if there be a substantial identity of parties and issues, yet in
'Lyon v. Rhode Island Co., 94 Ati. (R. I.) 893.
'Greenleaf on Evidence, § 164. Wigmore on Evidence, § 1386.
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its application the authorities seem to be sharply divided. The
rule has been strictly interpreted by one line of decisions, and
precise identity of parties and issues has been made a mechanical
text, rigid compliance with which is necessary to the admissibility
of such testimony 3 The case of Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v.
Gumby,4 on facts similar to those of the principal case, held
such testimony inadmissible. The English case, Morgan v.
Nichol,5 and the mutuality theory there advanced, i. e., that testi-
mony given against B in a former action, though relevant, cannot
now be offered by A against B unless B could have offered it
against A, has had a considerable influence on the decisions of
these courts. In civil actions arising out of the same transactions
with criminal cases, however, the courts have refused to follow
the reasoning of the English case, and in accordance with the
principal case, have held that the admissibility of this sort of
evidence turns more on the oath, and the opportunity for cross-
examination on the part of the one against whom the evidence
is offered, than on the precise identity of parties and issues." The
rule has been given the same liberal interpretation by courts in
negligence cases," in an action against a surety on a sheriff's
bond," and in disbarment proceedings,9 though in none of these
cases was the party offering such testimony also a party to the
previous trial.
The purpose of requiring identity of parties and issues is
merely to insure that there was the same degree of motive and
interest, as regards the conducting of an adequate cross-exami-
nation, at the former trial. If the motive and interest of the.
party against whom this sort of evidence is offered were fully
as strong for an adequate cross-examination at the former
trial, as they would be in the present one, and the logical pro-
'Hooper v. Southern Ry. Co., 112 Ga. 96; Patty v. Salem Flouring Co.,
96 P. (Oregon) 11o6; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. American
Cereal Co., 215 I1. 123.
'99 Fed. 192.
"L. R. 2 C. P. 117.
Kreuger v. Sylvester, ioo Iowa 647; Heatley %,. Long, 68 S. E. (Ga.)
783; North River Ins. Co. v. Walker, 16I Ky. 368; Ray v. Henderson,
144 P. (Old.) 175. Contra: Mclnturf v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 155 Il. App.
225.
"Minnea v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 162 S. W. (Mo.) 741; Indianapolis
& St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Stout, 53 Ind. 142.
' Woodworth v. Gossline, 69 P. (Colo.) 705.
'In re Durant, 8o Conn. 14o.
COMMENTS
bative value of the testimony be unquestioned, it would seem
immaterial that the party offering such testimony was not a
party to the previous trial, for the party against whom it is
offered has had all the safeguards, i. e., oath, cross-examination,
confrontation, and the perjury penalty, the lack of which con-
stitute the only objection to the admission of hearsay.
When it is considered that courts have gone to extremes in
admitting much weaker grades of evidence, e. g., declarations
against interest, admissions, and dying declarations, the argument
for a liberal attitude in admitting this sort of evidence would
seem unanswerable. On principle, the doctrine of the principal
case would seem to be correct.
F.R.
PERSUADING BREACH OF BAIL BOND TO THE DAMAGE OF ONE NOT
A PARTY TO THE BOND AS A TORT.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has decided recently" that
one who induces another to forfeit his bond to appear in court
is liable for the damage thereby caused to persons under con-
tract, to his knowledge, to indemnify the sureties. The damage
sustained was not money paid under the contract of indemnity,
but money expended by the plaintiffs in having the prisoner
brought back into the jurisdiction from which he fled, so that
the judgments on the bail bonds were set aside. The decision
was based upon the doctrine that one who maliciously induces
another to break a contract to the injury of the person with
whom the contract was made, is liable to that person for the
damage caused thereby.
At an early date it was decided that a master might maintain
an action against one who enticed away his servant or harbored
him with knowledge of his former contract.2 It was held an
actionable wrong where the defendant "unlawfully and unjustly
persuaded, procured, and enticed the wife to continue absent
from the plaintiff."3 But it was not until the famous case of
Lumley v. Gye,4 that the general rule was laid down. This case
was approved and followed by the Court of Appeal5 twenty-eight
'Wakin v. Wakin, i8o S. W. (Ark.) 471. (McCulloch, C. J., dissenting.)
2Hambleton v. Veere, 2 Saund. i69; Reg. v. Collingwood, Ld. Raymond
1116.
Winsinore v. Greenback, Willes 577.
'2 El. & El. 216. (Coleridge, J., dissenting.)
5 Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333, 337. (Lord Coleridge, C. 3., dissenting.)
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years later, when Brett, L. J., thus stated the principle upon
which the doctrine is based: "Wherever a man does an act
which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as
may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury
to another, and which in the particular case does produce such
an injury, an action on the case will lie. This is the proposi-
tion to be deduced from the case of Ashby v. White."' Coleridge
dissented in both cases. His chief reason was stated in Bowen
v. Hall at page 343. "If a man maliciously endeavors to persuade
another to break a contract, but fails in his endeavor, the
malicious motive is not itself a cause of action. It is, I believe,
also admitted . . . that if a man endeavors to persuade
another to break his contract, and succeeds in his endeavor,
yet if he does this without what the law calls 'malice,' the
damage which results is not in itself a cause of action
against him. But if the damage which is not in itself actionable
be joined to a motive which is not in itself actionable, the two
together form a cause of action. . . . I venture to think that
in this there is a fallacy." However, that there are cases in
which an act may be a tort because of the wrongful motive
of the actor is no longer to be doubted.7  A man has a right
to hunt and shoot on his own land, but when he does so for
no other purpose than to scare away game from the land of his
neighbor, his malicious motive makes an otherwise innocent
act, an actionable wrong.8 It is certainly the privilege of
every man to compete in business with his neighbor, but where
a wealthy banker maliciously established a barber shop, not for
the purpose of serving any legitimate purpose of his own, but
for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff, and damage
resulted, he .was held to have committed a tort.9 In some of
the states the malevolent draining of a neighbor's spring is a
tort.1"
In the United States, the majority of the courts 1 have fol-
lowed the English doctrine of Lumley v. Gye,'2 but some of
'Ld. Raymond 938.
SXVIII Harvard Law Review 411.
'Keeble v. Hickeringill, II East 574.
'Tuttle v. Buck, lO7 Minn. 145.
"°Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116; Barclay v. Abraham, 121 Iowa 61g.
"' Walker v. Cronin, 1O7 Mass. 555; Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225;
Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443; Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, etc. Ry.,
15, U. S. I.
' Supra.
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the states limit the right to recover to cases where the breach
was induced by fraud or coercion, or where the relation of
master and servant existed between the contracting parties.13
The jurisdiction of the principal case had previously declared
that "persons who aid another to violate a contract with a
stranger, whether for the purpose of injuring the latter or for
the purpose of obtaining some benefit for themselves at the
latter's expense, to his injury, are guilty of an actionable wrong,
and are liable for damages."' 4 In the principal case the prisoner
had no contract with the plaintiffs, which the defendant induced
or aided him to break. His contract was with the State and
with the sureties on his bonds. The damage to the plaintiffs
was money expended by them to prevent loss to the sureties
whom they were bound to indemnify. The facts of this case
do not bring it literally within the doctrine of the former
Arkansas case, but it remains to consider whether it is not
within the spirit of that doctrine.
To constitute a tort, two things must concur, damnum and an
injuria. Since the prisoner was under no c6ntractual obliga-
tion to the plaintiffs to appear, his non-appearance was not a
legal wrong as to them, the dissenting judge argues, and since
it was no wrong as to the plaintiffs for the prisoner not to
appear, it was no wrong as to them for the defendant to
persuade him to leave the jurisdiction. It is generally held not
unlawful to persuade a man to break an unenforceable agree-
ment,5 unless fraud or coercion is employed,' 6 but where there
was evidence of express malice, it was held actionable to persuade
a man not to enter into a contract with the plaintiff to the
latter's damage.' 7 In the principal case there was no evidence
of fraud, coercion, or express malice. It is sometimes stated
that whenever the wrongful act of one person causes damage to
another, damage which is the natural and probable consequence
of the wrongful act, an action on the case will lie. In Anthony
"Bourlier Bros. v. McCauley, 91 Ky. 135; Jackson v. Morgan, 94 N. E.
(Ind.) 1O21; Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578.
"'Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130.
'McGuire v. Gersiley, 204 U. S. 489 (where the defendant persuaded
another to terminate a partnership for an uncertain period); Roberts v.
Clark, 1O3 S. W. (Tex.) 417 (optional contract); Davidson v. Oakes,
128 S. W. (Tex.) 944 (contract within Statute of Frauds).
"
8Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 83; Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592.
'Lewis v. Bloede, 2o2 Fed. 7; Snow v. Judson, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 21o.
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v. Slaid,18 the defendant had committed an assault upon a pauper,
thus increasing the expense of the plaintiff who was under
contract to support the pauper. The court through Chief Justice
Shaw said: "It is not by means of any natural or legal relation
between the plaintiff and the party injured that the plaintiff
sustgns any loss by the act of the defendant, but by means of a
special contract by which he had undertaken to support the town
paupers. The damage is too remote and indirect." In the
principal case the plaintiff sustained loss in order to prevent a
greater loss he would have sustained by reason of a contract of
indemnity with a third party. The reasoning of the dissenting
judge is persuasive, but the modem tendency is to compensate
all innocent persons for damage suffered because of another's
acts. The act of the defendant in the principal case was wrong-
ful. The contracts on the bonds and the contract of indemnity
were so interrelated that the defendant's wrongful act was
likely, as a natural and probable consequence of it, to produce
injury, and it did produce injury. The principal case, though
not within the letter of those cases which hold that it is a tort
to persuade another to break a contract with a third person to
his damage, is within the spirit of the doctrine upon which those
cases rest, and is a wise extension of that doctrine to a novel
situation.
S. H. S.
ii Metc. (Mass.) 29o.
